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Introduction
Historically, the financial centre of London evolved as a typical Marshallian district serving the sprawling British Empire (Davis & Huttenback, 1986; Kynaston, 2011) . As the British Empire and the British economy's status as a major industrial power declined during the course of the 20 th century, it was only to be expected that there would be a corresponding decline in the City of London's position as a leading international financial centre (IFC). This expectation was indeed temporarily met in the periods immediately preceding and succeeding WWII when the US emerged as the capitalist world's economic superpower and New York took over London's mantle as the world's foremost financial centre. However, from the early Or perhaps a unique combination of historical and geographical circumstances? The literature on financial centres offers two contrasting theories. One theory points to a combination of factors that span socio-economic, political, legal and geographical factors. In this interpretation, spurred by the deregulatory reforms of the 1986 'Big Bang', London was able to cash in on its stable political and business environment, reliable regulatory framework, English common law, and favourable geographical position including a central time zone and concentration of human talent (Yeandle, 2015; Yeandle, et al., 2005 ).
An alternative theory suggests, in contrast, that London is the world's premier 'onshore-offshore' centre, whose revival dates back to the emergence of unregulated These two streams of academic arguments have largely evolved in contraposition to one another. It is typically believed that IFCs develop either at the heart of large and sprawling manufacturing and commercial centres (such as New York, Tokyo, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Paris and Frankfurt, known colloquially as 'onshore' financial centres), or alternatively, as a result of context-based discriminatory practices which may explain the rise of OFCs such as Zurich, Cayman Islands or Bermuda.
In this article we inquire to what extent the two theoretical positions can be reconciled. Our key premise is that London's dominant position in the global financial system is an anomaly. Unlike any other contender, the City of London has been able to fuse together, in a mutually reinforcing dynamic, two distinct sets of criteria for an IFC. On the one hand, capitalising on its historical position at the heart of the British Empire, London developed a wide range of scale economies and market efficiencies. On the other hand, London is able to serve as a unique offshore financial hub due to a series of discriminatory regulatory practices that are tailor-made for specific segments of finance. The case of London suggests that when a large and sprawling traditional financial centre is further supported by the institutions and practices of offshore financial centres, it builds into a globally spanning financial hub that uniquely benefits from scale economies, political stability and skills agglomeration, as well as from a highly benign regulatory and fiscal environment. No other leading financial centre can lay claim to having been able to satisfy all of these requisite criteria to the same degree.
The paper presents three case studies to substantiate the argument: (a) those pertaining to the market for international loans and deposits; (b) the forex (FX) and over the counter (OTC) derivatives markets; and (c) the area of asset and collateral management. Each of these cases suggests that the competitive lead of London in modern finance is based on scale economies, established institutional links with other financial hubs as well as human skills, combined with discriminatory practices and regulatory or fiscal advantages. Together, these three areas establish a competitive lead in terms of market depth, liquidity and scale economics of financial innovation, making the City of London a unique ecosystem in global finance.
The Growth of Financial Centres
Early theories of financial centres have tended to associate their rise with the dynamics of the underlying economy and the specifics of geographical location (e.g. Christaller 1966) . In this framework, the growth of a financial centre was constrained by geographical conditions and predetermined by the success of the manufacturing or services, which ultimately left little room for political action in guiding the development of a financial centre. Charles Kindleberger's (1973 Kindleberger's ( , 1974 seminal study of the rise of world financial centres, while rooted in the economic rationale, would move academic understandings away from geographical reductionism, and towards a more nuanced reading of a financial centre that can thrive due to a combination of economic, logistical, infrastructural and other factors.
Kindleberger described the development and the geographical spread of IFCs as a variant of Marshallian district theory (Marshall 1990 "Governmental policy can accelerate the emergence of a given city as the primary financial center, it can slow the process down, but it can probably not change the outcome. Too strongly pressing centralization will create resistance, and strong efforts for decentralization can be overcome by private forces" (Kindleberger 1973: 93) .
Interestingly, writing amidst the currency turbulence of the early 1970s and analysing the early steps towards European financial integration, Kindleberger believed that it was Brussles, rather Zurich, Frankfurt or Paris, was the leading candidate for the mantle of the financial centre of the fledgling European Economic Community.
Kindleberger's analysis of London's prospects was more sceptical, although insightful as to the timing of a possible change: "Sterling is too weak, and British savings too little available to advance London's claim for consideration. The advantages of centralization are less compelling than they were in the middle of the 19th century. They still exist. Despite cultural resistance, and only with difficulty, I predict centralization will take place, but not before the late 1980s" (Kindleberger 1973: 93-94 (Dixon, 2001, p.105; Goodfriend 1988) . Similarly, a BIS study acknowledged the increasingly cooperative nature of modern international finance by noting that the large IFCs serve as global hubs for financial activities, linked as it were, to the secondary centres (Goetz 2007 ).
An alternative explanation for the division of labour among financial centres is presented by Gehrig (2000) . 'Trade in informationally sensitive securities', he argues, 'is likely to be geographically concentrated at those locations where information about those securities is aggregated and communicated. In contrast, trade in standardized securities is more likely to be footloose, reacting more sensitively to (regulatory) cost differentials' (Gehrig 2000: 417-8 IFCs are not only an economic phenomenon but also an important pillar of the global financial architecture and geography (Cohen 1998; Germain 1997; Langley 2002) . In contrast to economists, political scientists pay greater attention to the evolution and diversity of IFCs as illustrations of the complexity of the state/market relationship in an increasingly interconnected world. Some argue, for instance, that OFCs encourage a 'race to the bottom' in international financial regulation that creates a regulatory vacuum that has, in turn, contributed to the global financial meltdown of 2007-9. Others suggest that these financial nodes are symptomatic of the complexity of political processes in an interdependent world, and seek to explain the failure of the advanced industrialised countries to mount a serious challenge to these centres (at the very least until recently, although the jury is out) by the existence of powerful political and economic interests (e.g. Clarke and O'Connor 1997).
Such theories are predicated on the assumption that financial actors gravitate towards locations that offer substantial cost reductions through the beneficial effects of positive externalities. Since those externalities include regulation and taxation, successful centres are those whose governments have introduced the requisite policies in these areas (Dharmapala & Hines, 2006; Baldacchino, 2006; Hampton, 1996 concentrates only on retail finance to protect consumers" (Sassen 1999 , emphasis added).
The evolution of the global financial system during the past 20-25 years would prove such an insight was correct. Even in the face of new competition from emerging regional financial hubs in Dubai, Singapore, Hong Kong and other havens, London has strengthened its role as a global financial centre. At the same time, the emphasis of many mainstream accounts of this continued leadership of London as IFC on scale efficiencies and flexible or accommodating regulatory policy tends to occlude the role of a more proactive discriminatory niche strategies that make London a unique 'inshore offshore' centre for capital. Below we unpack this argument, focusing on three specific areas of global financial activity.
Re-emergence of London as a global financial centre
In his book, the Re-Emergence of Global Finance, Gary Burn (Burn, 2005) argues that the decline of London was arrested due to the emergence of wholesale loan market in 1957 known as the Euromarket ironically, for reasons that were directly linked to the collapsing The emergence of the Euromarket phenomenon alerted scholars to the fact that the importance of discriminatory practices to the development of financial centres ranked alongside the importance of traditional scale economy and agglomeration advantages. On the basis of these forces, London financial houses were able to reduce a crucial fixed cost dimension of trading in incorporeal assets, namely, the regulatory dimension. In effect,
London seized the initiative in the development of the wholesale international financial markets, an initiative to which other centres had to respond as evidenced by subsequent developments. Contrary to popular perception, the US Treasury initially objected to the rise of the unregulated market in London and put forward proposals for a new regulatory framework (Kapstein 1994) . When these proposals came to nothing, the US Treasury ( with the active encouragement of the New York banking community led by Citibank and Chase Manhattan) came to the conclusion that rather than resist the emergence of an unregulated global financial market, the US stood to gain by encouraging a domestic offshoot of this offshore market. Clear manifestation of the swift volt-face that took place was the establishment on 3 rd of December 1981 of the New York offshore market, the New York
International Banking Facilities (IBF), a local, albeit more restricted, variant of the London offshore market. Just as the US IBF was set up as a defensive measure on the part of U.S.
government regulators seeking to 'internalize' the Euromarkets into the U.S. banking system, so also was this true of Japan that followed suit in 1986 by establishing its own IBF, the Japanese Offshore Market (JOM) (Moffett and Stonehill 1989; Hanzawa 1991) .
By the 1970s, it had become clear that the success of London as a major financial capital was built on central two pillars: an historical concentration of professional and technical know-how in international finance on the one side, and the rise of the unregulated Euromarkets on the other. This said, London had some disadvantages. First and foremost of these was the fact that while London's financial market was largely unregulated or 'offshore', British banks, which were among the core institutions of this market, were still subject to corporate taxation. Second, while British banks could not pose as non-residents for taxation purposes, American and other foreign banks could benefit from transfer pricing to ensure low taxation thus giving them an important competitive advantage over their British counterparts.
Third, as London's offshore market grew in size and complexity, the cost of conducting business in London became an additional vexing issue.
These conditions heralded in turn the next pivotal step in the global ascent of London as a financial hub. As the City transformed itself into a large and flourishing OFC, or a conduit through which bankers, increasingly of American, Japanese and German origins, have learned to register financial transactions to avoid various regulations, the idea of using other, closely related jurisdictions sharing British law and regulations but having the added advantage of low taxation, seemed logical. In expanding operations internationally, London institutions appear to have sought the path of least resistance, selecting British imperial polities that broadly resembled the City of London's unique political structure. As a result, In sum, if the City of London originally developed as a scale economy-based financial centre, it was the subsequent deployment of favourable discriminatory practices that helped it to consolidate its key position in the global wholesale financial market. Table 1 OFCs are better balanced, which suggest that these are largely conduit centres. Table 2 presents an amalgamated position of the UK and its linked possessions including the Chanel tax evasion and avoidance appeared to have rendered OFCs less attractive in this particular market segment. The second development, as was to be expected, was the rise of East Asia and emerging markets. The third development was, as can be seen from the tables, a marked corresponding shift of this market segment from OFC to onshore centers in Europe.
TABLES 1 & 2, 3 & 4 HERE
There has been considerable discussion of the changing nature of global cross-border bank lending in the past few years. Cerutti (Cerutti, et al., 2014) for example, document the changing composition of cross-border lending between syndicated and non-syndicated loans. (Avdjiev & Takats, 2014) analyse the decline of cross-border bank lending to emerging markets, while (Hills & Hoggarth, 2013 ) discuss prudential implication of the market. We could not find a corresponding discussion that explains the relative decline of London and its satellite OFCs in the past few years in this market. Our hypothesis is that the measures discussed above, taken in conjunction with the competition from New Yorks' IBF and Tokyo's JOM have eroded, but not eliminated, the discriminatory advantage of London and
British controlled tax havens in this particular market segment of the international financial system. However, as we shall now demonstrate below, this negative trend has been counterbalanced by London's strengthening of position in other market segments of the international financial system.
London's position in the global FX and OTC derivatives markets
According to the most recent BIS triennial survey of the FX markets (BIS, 2016), daily foreign exchange turnover averaged $5.1 trillion, with the overwhelming majority of this turnover occurring in just five jurisdictions: the UK (37%), the US (19%), Singapore (7.9%), Hong Kong (6.7 %) and Japan (6.1%). The dominance of the UK and the US in the FX markets can be traced partially to the speculative trading activities of the hedge funds that are based (or managed) in London and New York. Faced with the task of generating above average returns (for which they charge, in return, above average fees) for their clients (traditionally wealthy individuals but also now increasingly institutional investors) hedge funds rely heavily on speculative currency trading as one of the principal means of achieving these returns. It is estimated that hedge funds account for over 50% of spot currency trade in
London and New York due to their use of sophisticated computer software and server proximity to exploit any exchange rate disturbances. As these disturbances are likely to be very small in the case of the most widely traded currencies (the US dollar, the euro, the UK pound, the yen and the Swiss franc between them account for over 92% of total daily FX turnover) given the depth and liquidity of the markets for these currencies, hedge funds trade these same currencies many times over, up to fifty times a day, so as to make any substantial profits (BIS, 2011).
As Considerations of costs and convenience also help to explain London's large percentage share of the global over the counter (OTC) interest rate derivatives market, which stands at 48% according to the last BIS triennial survey. Derivatives are financial instruments that are used by a wide array of financial institutions to either hedge against, or alternatively speculate on, risk. While there are several other types of derivatives, including FX derivatives, credit swaps, and equity derivatives, interest rate derivatives are by far the most important (typically accounting for between 80 to 90% of the entire market), a fact that largely ties in with the exigencies of institutional asset management. Although there are other users of interest rate derivatives, including non-financial corporations and governments and their agencies, it is insurance companies and pension funds that are, alongside the banks, the heaviest users of these products. This is because their long dated liabilities resulting from pension and annuity products have very large interest rate exposures that can prove costly in the face of even the smallest changes in interest rates, a problem which is compounded by the fact that on the asset side of their balance sheets insurance companies and pension funds typically hold securities that have a different return-risk profile to their liabilities. In order to reduce this mismatch, interest rate derivatives are used by insurance companies and pension funds to hedge their liabilities by providing them with products whose values move in the opposite direction of those associated with any interest rate changes.
Although exchange traded derivatives are cheaper because they are bought and sold wholesale on a formal exchange (such as Chicago's CME Group, the world's largest exchange) their standardised nature renders them unsuitable for the particular needs of individual asset managers. Over the counter (OTC) derivatives are more appropriate in this regard because they are off-exchange products that are negotiated and traded on a bilateral basis and thus can be tailored to fit customer's needs. However, as end-users are unlikely to have exactly equal and opposite needs that can be matched easily, the large commercial banks play a crucial intermediary role in the OTC derivatives market in that they occupy the opposing sides of OTC trades. The risks undertaken by banks in these trades with clients are pooled together, with this aggregate risk pool then typically being hedged in the wholesale exchange traded derivative markets. Now if we take into account that insurance companies are heavy users of interest rate swaps and that Europe has the largest share of the global insurance market (35%, as compared with 28% for the US) and add to these observations the fact that London has one of the largest concentration of commercial banks in the world, we can see why London is the foremost centre of the global OTC interest rate derivatives markets. It can be noted once again that although the UK is not in the Eurozone, by far the largest proportion of euro-denominated derivatives (an average daily value of $573 billion in 2016, according to Intercontinental Exchange (ICE)) are cleared by London-based platforms.
London's predominant shares of Eurozone FX swap transactions and European OTC interest rate derivatives transactions has been a cause of envy if not also of concern amongst the political and financial elites in Frankfurt and Paris. However, the huge gulf separating
London as the world's premier IFC from Frankfurt and Paris as relatively minor continental
European financial centres is a direct reflection of the diametrically opposed approaches to financial regulation. As we mentioned above, London has long been a major IFC because the two broad sets of factors required for any geographical location to become a viable financial centre -the 'economic' set (scale economies, skills clustering, etc.) and the 'political' set 
London as the Global Centre for Asset and Collateral Management
The longevity of London's reign as a premier centre for finance is in large part, due to its dynamism: major historical shifts within the global financial system were reflected in the shifts within the City. Over the past three decades, two inter-related processes have defined Raising capital, or funding, centers on the process known as liquidity transformation.
It involves the provision to investors of liquid claims that are typically backed by illiquid assets, and is a key function of many financial intermediaries. Historically, liquidity transformation has been primarily performed by banks, which would hold illiquid loans but
give investors liquid deposits (Chernenko and Sunderam 2016: 1) . However, even before the 2007-09 crisis, asset managers provided similar services, partly by being able to create short term liquidity from illiquid assets by using them as collateral in capital market operations.
Post-2009, in the wide range of regulatory initiatives, it is Basle 3, aimed at raising capital and liquidity requirements for the banking sector, which has been the most consequential (Manna 2015) . Responding to Basle 3, banks and financial institutions had to minimise their reliance on unsecured finding and instead rely much more on collateralised transactions. This in turn, has made collateral management and the attendant capital market mechanisms that facilitate it, fundamental to the operation of the financial system and financial stability.
As a sub-set of wealth management sector, the asset management industry is dominated by three principal types of professional managers of funds: mutual funds, pension funds, and private-client assets, as well as foundations, endowments, central bank reserves and other large financial pools requiring institutional asset management services, such as for instance, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) (Walter 1999). Together, hedge funds, pension funds, insurance companies and alternative investors operating out of London control £4,230 bn of assets (Burrows and Lowe 2015) . At the same time, they are reported to have more £15 trillion of assets under management (UKTI 2015: 8) . This latter figure accounts for about a quarter of global assets managed professionally, currently estimated to be around $85 trillion (BCG 2015; IMF 2015) and makes London the second largest fund management market in the world (UKTI 2015). In various international surveys, London tops the list of most desired destinations for fund management, ahead of Hong Kong, Singapore and New York.
This unique niche is confirmed by the Global Financial Centres Index (Table 5 ). Globally, "the UK's share of the global hedge fund industry more than doubled in the decade up to 2011 to 18 per cent, when 85 per cent of European hedge fund assets were managed out of the UK" (UKTI 2013: 5).
Insert Table 5 about here.
Two specific mechanisms of capital markets -the market for repurchase operations (repos) and collateral management -help us understand why the concentration of liquidity, skills, informational and technological capital makes London so central for these two areas of capital management. Collateral and liquidity management has been defined 'as the optimal management of credit, collateral, capital and all related execution, pricing, operational, documentation, and risk management of a portfolio across all products, all business units, and all locations' (Hill 2015: 6, Box 1) . Repo markets, best understood as markets for short-term secured loans, are essential to the efficient market funding and balance sheet management.
The repo market (estimated European size is 6 trillion euros, compared with $10 trillion in the USA) is the lifeblood of modern capital markets. 5 Although the complex network of repo transactions is dominated by banks, they form part of the larger collateral chain that ties together the banking sector, asset management, institutions typically associated with 'financial plumbing', as well as real economic assets. London is a premier global platform facilitating collateral management and capital market lending due to, first, existing economies of scale and scope, and second, as a result of nuanced and targeted regulatory provisions.
With its developed network of relationships and wide scope for efficient international services, the City accommodates a great variety of capital raisers and securities dealers and is a crucial node in global capital market infrastructure. comprised over 90% of collateral eligible for rehypothecation and more than 80% of collateral actually rehypothecated. Government securities accounted for the second most used asset class, followed by 'other securities' (ISDA 2015) . Given that London is the largest global hub for FX markets as well as derivatives trades, it is reasonable to conclude that, targeted regulatory niche policies have cemented London's premiership in asset management generally and collateral management specifically.
Furthermore, in 2011-13, the UK government specifically targeted the asset management sector by offering a set of regulatory exceptions. In addition to no limits on collateral rehypothecation 10 (compared with a far more restrictive limit of 140% in USA), these regulatory niches include: fifty percent reduction in time for the FCA authorisation of a new fund; passport benefits (under EU rules, fund managers can register funds in one Member State and then freely market them across the whole of the EU); some 120 double taxation agreements, which can benefit funds domiciled in the UK and, perhaps most crucially, which include a range of tax exceptions for fund managers that are aimed to make UK more competitive than Ireland and even Luxemburg (UKTI 2013).
Just as in international bank lending and in the FX and OTC derivatives markets therefore, in the global capital markets, London has managed to fuse together the classical advantages of scale economies and targeted discriminatory practices. On the one hand, London's history as a global financial centre means that any firm operating out of London can benefit from the available efficiencies and scale economies, now multiplied across the sectors that comprise and service the finance industry. On the other hand, in the era of asset management and the post-2009 period of collateralised lending, London has reinforced these traditional sets of economic advantages by targeted policies and regulatory niche initiatives.
Conclusion
In the framework of classical theories of financial centres, London's success as a premier global financial hub is an anomaly. The size of the UK economy is disproportionally small compared to the size of the UK financial sector, and traditional economic arguments cannot explain the ascent of London as a global financial centre. At the same time, London is not a typical offshore financial centre (OFC) either: unlike booking or registration havens, London is home to a wide range of financial, clearing, capital raising and risks management activities undertaken by bank and non-bank financial institutional on behalf of a wide range of UK, European and overseas clients.
Having analysed the area of cross-border bank lending, FX and derivatives trade and the asset management industry, we have argued that London's success as a financial centre is neither due exclusively to scale economies factors, nor to discriminatory practices. Rather, a combination of conditions that are unique to London help explain why it has been able to draw on both economic and regulatory factors to bolster its success.
As a declining traditional Marshallian financial district, London benefitted enormously from the rise of the Euromarkets on the back of audacious discriminatory practices. The expanding Euromarkets sustained a return to scale economies, which, combined with London's reputation for permissive regulatory environment, placed London as the leading centre in the fledgling FX swap market. For similar reasons, and considering subtle discriminatory practices accepted in London, combined with its deep liquidity as a large whole-scale financial centre, London is also a leading centre for the asset management industry. Up to now, no other financial centre in the world has managed to capitalise on the competitive advantages arising from the economies of scale, and on subtle regulatory discrimination in quite the same way.
At the time of writing, it is far too premature to project the effects of Brexit on the position of London in the global financial topography. At the heart of any development will be the risks of Brexit to London's scale economies, and the opportunities for further regulatory exceptions afforded by the departure from EU. Ultimately though, this centres on the conflict between regulatory issues on the one side and liquidity issues on the other. The moves by EU elites to relocate euro trading back to the continent will undermine the liquidity and efficiency of London's markets. Yet it is unlikely that such a relocation will occur any 
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